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On appeal from an Order of Dismissal by the Third Judicial District Court for Salt
Lake County, State of Utah, The Honorable Sheila K. McCleve presiding, granting
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, entered December 7, 2003.
INTRODUCTION
The named Plaintiffs and Appellants in this case (hereafter "Appellants"), all property
owners along the expanded Highway 89 corridor between Farmington and South Ogden,
were compelled to file suit before the trial court to vindicate their right to recoup costs and
attorneys fees incurred by reason of UDOT's attempts to expropriate their property rights
without paying compensation. Despite its own regulation entitling property owners such as
Appellants to the recovery of reasonable costs and expenses (including attorneys fees)
incident to the settlement of inverse condemnation proceedings, UDOT has made every effort
to avoid compensating any of the landowners along the Highway 89 corridor (including the
named Appellants in this action) for attorneys fees necessarily incurred due to its own
conduct.
The Appellants' problems began in 1996, when UDOT published an Environmental
Impact Statement announcing that 136 homes and 22 businesses located along a proposed
Highway 89 expansion corridor between South Ogden and Layton, Utah, would likely be
impacted by future road expansion. This announcement promptly rendered the affected
properties unmarketable - yet UDOT refused to acquire them, or to compensate the owners
for its actions.
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Numerous property owners (including Appellants) thereupon engaged legal counsel
to pursue both judicial and legislative remedies. The result was a combination of lobbying
before both the legislature and the Department of Transportation, and the filing of a
Complaint before the Second Judicial District Court for Davis County, State of Utah, on
behalf of all property owners within the affected corridor (proposed for certification as a
class pursuant to Rule 23, Utah R. Civ. P.). Before the Davis County Court could rule upon
certification of the class, however, UDOT negotiated a settlement in the Davis County action.
The settlement, however, even though it named only four of the remaining nominal plaintiffs
in the Davis County action, benefitted far more corridor residents and landowners than that it resulted in the allocation of approximately $10 million to compensate numerous property
owners along the affected corridor, and established a compensation "matrix" for acquisition
of properties and compensation of their owners, including the named Appellants in this
proceeding.
The settlement, however, expressly reserved the question of the recoverability of
attorneys fees - which UDOT continued to maintain its was not obligated to do for any
affected property owner. In post-settlement proceedings, the Second District Court initially
held that UDOT was not liable for attorneys fees to any property owner with whom UDOT
had made settlement. The Utah Supreme Court reversed, however, holding that, pursuant to
federal regulations expressly adopted by UDOT, attorneys fees were recoverable in
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connection with the settlement effected in the Davis County proceeding. The case was
remanded for a determination of reasonable attorneys fees.1
UDOT then submitted a motion in limine in the Davis County action, asking the court
to exclude evidence of any costs and attorneys fees incurred by any property owner not
expressly named as a party plaintiff therein - including members of the putative class never
accepted nor rejected in that action. The Davis County Court held that, as the class had not
been certified, it had no personal jurisdiction over any property owner not named as a party
plaintiff in that action, and could therefore award no attorneys fees therein except in favor
of the named plaintiffs therein.
At this point, the Appellants (who had expressly entered into retainer agreements with
legal counsel in connection with UDOT's taking of their properties, but had been members
of the proposed class in the Davis County proceeding, rather than individually-named
plaintiffs therein) filed this action before the Third Judicial District Court for Salt Lake
County, State of Utah, submitting themselves to the personal jurisdiction of that court for
purposes of seeking an award of attorneys fees as provided by the Utah Supreme Court.
UDOT, though, moved to dismiss. UDOT's argument, essentially, was that (1) the
Appellants named in this action were not parties to a "proceeding" settled by UDOT in the
Second District, and therefore have no claim for relief under the federal/state regulatory
scheme; and (2) Appellants' claims in this action are somehow barred by the doctrine of res

1

Robinson v. State, 20 P. 3d 396 (Utah 2001).
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judicata, or claim preclusion, due to the ruling issued in the Davis County action, even
though it had expressly held that Appellants were not even parties thereto. The trial court
agreed, holding that, if Appellants were not before the Second District Court, they were
outside the scope of parties to a "proceeding" entitled to the recovery of fees by law, whereas
if they were parties before the Second District Court, they are bound by res judicata.
In fact, the named Appellants herein have very much been a part of the "proceeding"
leading up to the settlement entered into in the Davis County action, and are entitled to
recovery of attorneys fees which they necessarily incurred incident thereto. The law
recognizes the term "proceeding" to be a broad one, broader in its scope than the term
"action." Given the language, purpose, and policy underlying the regulatory scheme upon
which Appellants (and all property owners in the affected corridor) rely in this matter, it is
unreasonable to conclude that Appellants have not been a party to a judicial, legislative and
administrative "proceeding" giving rise to the settlement of their grievance against UDOT,
and thus their entitlement to attorneys fees. Even if the term "proceeding" is limited to the
Davis County action, moreover, Appellants were part of the identified group offered for class
certification therein, and thereby participated in that "proceeding." Moreover, whether or
not they were named as parties to the Second District Court action, Appellants herein
incurred their attorneys fees "because o f that proceeding and incident to "a settlement"
effectuated therein, thereby clearly qualifying under the express regulatory language.
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Appellants' claims in this action are clearly not barred by the doctrine ofres judicata
or claim preclusion by reason of any order entered in the Davis County case. It is precisely
because the Second District Court declined to exercise jurisdiction over them, and thus to
rule on their petition, that Appellants have been compelled to file this action at all.
JURISDICTION
This is an appeal from a final Order and Judgment of the Third Judicial District Court
for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, The Honorable Sheila K. McCleve presiding, dismissing
the lower court action under Rule 12(b)(6), Utah R. Civ. P., holding that Appellants'
Complaint failed to state a claim for which relief may be granted.
Jurisdiction obtains pursuant to Section 78-2-2(3)(j), Utah Code Ann. 1953 (as
amended). The appeal was referred to the Court of Appeals pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-2-2(5), by order of referral dated January 20, 2004.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
AND STANDARD FOR REVIEW
1.

Whether the lower court erred in finding that, as a matter of law, Appellants

stated no claim for which relief could be granted to recover attorneys fees incident to
UDOT's taking of their property pursuant to 49 C.F.R. Part 24.107 and Utah Admin. Code
R933-1.
2.

Whether the lower court erred in finding that, as a matter of law, Appellants'

stated claim for relief against UDOT for recovery of costs and attorneys fees incident to
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UDOT's taking of their property was barred under the doctrine of res judicata, or claim
preclusion.
The standard of review for both issues before this Court is de novo review, the lower
court having dismissed Appellants' claims as failing to state a claim for which relief may be
granted under Rule 12(b)(6), Utah R. Civ. P. This Court is obliged to construe the Complaint
in the light most favorable to Appellants, and to indulge all reasonable inferences in their
favor. Educators Mutual Insurance Association v. Allied Property & Casualty Insurance
Company, 890 P.2d 1029 (Utah 1995); Prows v. State, 822 P.2d 764 (Utah 1991); Heiner v.
S 1 Groves and Sons Company, 790 P.2d 107 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).
DETERMINATIVE CASE LAW AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS
1.

49 C.F.R. Part 24.107:

The owner of the real property shall be reimbursed for any reasonable expenses,
including reasonable attorney, appraisal, and engineering fees, which the owner
actually incurred because of a condemnation proceeding, if:
(a) the final judgment of the court is that the agency cannot acquire the
real property by condemnation, or
(b) the condemnation proceeding is abandoned by the agency other
than under an agreed-upon settlement; or
(c) the court having jurisdiction renders a judgment in favor of the
owner in an inverse condemnation proceeding or the agency effects a
settlement of such proceeding.
2.

42 U.S.C. § 4621(b):
This subchapter establishes a uniform policy for the fair and equitable
treatment of persons displaced as a direct result of programs or projects
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undertaken by a federal agency or with federal financial assistance.
The primary purpose of this subchapter is to ensure that such persons
shall not suffer disproportionate injuries as a result of programs and
projects designed for the benefit of the public as a whole and to
minimize the hardship of displacement on such persons.
3.

Utah Admin. Code R933-1-1. Right of Way Acquisition Incorporation of
Federal Publication.
The State of Utah incorporates by reference 49 CFR 24 as amended in the
Federal Register, March 2,1989, as its administrative rules on the acquisition
of rights of way for federal-aid projects.

4.

Robinson, et ah v. Utah Department oj"Transportation, 2001 UT 21,20 P. 3d
396 (Utah 2001).

5.

Snyder v. Murray City Corporation, 2003 UT 13,471 Utah Adv. Rep. 5,2003
Utah Lex. 34 (2003)
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This action was filed on June 30, 2003, before the Third Judicial District Court for
Salt Lake County, State of Utah, as the result of a ruling by The Honorable Glen R. Dawson
of the Second Judicial District Court for Davis County, State of Utah, in the case of Kay K.
Robinson; VaneR. and Marilee L. Scadden; Benjamin E. and Le Joie Reichel, Plaintiffs, v.
State of Utah and its Agency, The Utah Department of Transportation, Defendant, Civil No.
970700484, that the named Appellants herein (all of them property owners who (1) retained
the services of legal counsel incident to UDOT's taking of their property interests, and (2)
as a direct and proximate result thereof, obtained settlements from UDOT of claims for
inverse condemnation of their property) were not entitled to the recovery of any costs or
649163vl
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attorneys fees as part of the Second District Court action, they not having been expresslynamed parties thereto) (R. 42-44). On July 1, 2003, UDOT filed a Motion to Dismiss
Appellants' Complaint, arguing that (1) not having been named as parties to the Second
District Court action, they were not part of a "proceeding," entitling them to recovery of
attorneys fees under applicable federal and state law, and (2) their claim was, in any case,
barred by the doctrine of res judicata, or claim preclusion.
By Order dated October 14, 2003, the trial court ruled that, if Appellants were
properly parties to the Second District action, their claim for attorneys fees was barred by the
doctrine of res judicata', if Appellants were not parties to the Second District Court action,
they had no standing to seek attorneys fees under applicable law (R. 87-91). The lower
court's ruling was memorialized in a Order of Dismissal signed December 12, 2003, and
filed December 17, 2003 (R. 92-95). Appellants filed their notice of appeal from the lower
court's Order on January 13, 2004 (R. 96-98).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On appeal from an order granting a motion to dismiss, this Court accepts as true all
well-pleaded allegations of the Complaint, and opposes the trial court's ruling only if it
clearly appears that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of its claim. Prows v.
State, 822 P.2d 764 (Utah 1991); Coleman v. Utah State Land Board, 795 P.2d 622 (Utah
1990).
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Accordingly, both the lower court' s ruling and this Court' s review thereof must accept
the following facts, taken from Appellants' Complaint herein (R. 1-9):
1.

During the early 1980's, the Utah Department of Transportation ("UDOT")

determined that the Highway 89 corridor between Farmington and South Ogden needed
significant expansion and improvements in order to increase public safety. After exploring
potential alternatives and holding public meetings, UDOT planned and plotted a preferred
route, as published in a required Environmental Impact Statement ("EIS"),2 and alerted the
public that 136 homes and 22 businesses, among other public properties, were to be affected.
Appellants' properties were among those specifically identified by the EIS report.
2.

After publication of the EIS, Appellants attempted to sell their properties, but

were unable to obtain fair market value as a direct and proximate result of having been
identified as an impacted property. Consequently, the value and marketability of all of the
affected properties had been negatively impacted.
3.

Appellants first requested that UDOT purchase the impacted properties for fair

market value. UDOT denied the Appellants' request, indicating a lack of funding.
4.

The Appellants' property had effectively been condemned or taken by UDOT' s

actions, without just compensation.

2

This final draft of this report was issued on September 9, 1996, in compliance with
the National Environmental Policy Act.
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5.

Appellants entered into various agreements with attorneys (collectively referred

to as "Appellants' Counsel"), to pursue, negotiate, resolve or litigate their claims of inverse
condemnation and just compensation against UDOT.
6.

In November 1997, the above-named Appellants, as interested or otherwise

similarly situated parties ("Appellants") participated in the filing of a Complaint ("Original
Complaint")3 in the Second Judicial District Court, Davis County, initiating an inverse
condemnation claim against the State of Utah and its agency the Utah Department of
Transportation ("UDOT") regarding the expansion and improvements of U.S. Highway 89
("Highway 89") through Davis County.
7.

Since being retained, Appellants' counsel has expended significant time, efforts

and costs for all Appellants, parties, and affected property owners interested or similarly
situated by inverse condemnation of UDOT along Highway 89. Specifically, Appellants'
counsel engaged in extensive efforts to negotiate and litigate a settlement which included
working with the Utah State Legislature to develop a fund for compensating the victims of
the State's condemnation acts, which resulted in approximately a $10,000,000.00 (Ten
Million Dollar) funding allocation to resolve the inverse condemnation proceeding.
8.

Following the Legislature's allocation of funds, UDOT had the necessary

capital to begin settling its cases with the named Appellants and began to do so. Four of the

3

See Robinson v. State of Utah (Civil No. 970700484 Second Judicial District Court,
Davis County, Judge Dawson).
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parties originally named in the Original Complaint, entered into a stipulation to dismiss the
original Complaint and settled, thus establishing a template for the Appellants in this case
to obtain individual resolution of property valuation and payments for those amounts.
9.

The Stipulation for Settlement left up to the court to decide the issue of

Appellants' attorneys fees.
10.

Subsequently, all of the above-named Appellants applied for, received benefits

from, and ultimately settled any condemnation claim which they may have had against
UDOT.
11.

Appellants' counsel made a motion to assess attorneys fees and costs associated

with the original Complaint against UDOT. Appellants' counsel was denied this request by
The Honorable Judge Dawson of the Second Judicial District Court. This ruling however,
was overturned by the Utah Supreme Court on March 6,2001. The Court held therein that,
"the Utah Administrative Code mandates an award of plaintiffs attorney's fees where UDOT
settles the plaintiffs inverse condemnation action," and remanded the case for further
proceedings.
12.

On remand, pursuant to a Motion in Limine, Judge Dawson ruled on

February 22,2002, that he lacked personal jurisdiction over any of the Appellants named in
this Complaint ("Second Complaint"), and could not receive evidence or make an award as
to these Appellants requiring the above listed Appellants to file this separate action relative
to their claim for reimbursement of attorneys fees.
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13.

The above-named Appellants, as owners of real property, contracted for

attorney services, entering into signed contingent fee retainer agreements, received specific
benefits of the $10 million settlement, and consequently are under an obligation to pay a
reasonable contingent attorneys fee as they became part of a class of beneficiaries of the
original Complaint.
14.

Having obligated themselves to the payment of attorneys fees for the

settlement of their claims, Appellants have requested of UDOT to reimburse them for any
reasonable expenses, including reasonable attorneys fees, as required by law. To date,
UDOT has denied such request.
15.

In addition to the above, some Appellants referenced above, were told by

UDOT that they must first discharge their attorneys prior to UDOT's willingness to enter into
a settlement negotiation and purchase their properties.
RELATED OR PRIOR APPEALS
There are no related or prior appeals relative to this action.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Supreme Court decision ofRobinson, etal v. UtahDept. of Transportation, 2001
Utah 21, 20 P.3d 396 (Utah 2001), established the rights of Utah landowners forced to
initiate "proceedings" in inverse condemnation to recover costs and attorneys fees from the
condemning agency - this by reason of 49 C.F.R. Part 24.107, adopted wholesale by the Utah
Department of Transportation and Utah Admin. Code R933-1. Appellants herein, while they
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were never admitted as nominal parties to the Second District Court action, were nonetheless
part of the "proceeding" settled by UDOT in Second District - (1) Appellants, no less than
the named plaintiffs in the Second District action, retained counsel and were represented in
resolution of claims represented in that action; (2) through their counsel, they participated
in negotiation and resolution of claims as represented in that action; (3) all fees were incurred
"because o f the Second District Court action; (4) the Second District Court action resulted
in "a settlement"; and (5) Appellants actually petitioned for joinder in the Second District
Court action (which, however, was settled as to all aspects with the exception of attorneys
fees before the Motion to Amend was ruled upon).
The lower court improperly posited that Appellants herein may have been barred by
the Second District Court ruling under doctrines of claim preclusion, or res judicata. The
Second District Court's ruling, however, made abundantly clear that the Appellants were not
parties therein - the court's ruling stated that, due to their status as non-parties, that court had
no personal jurisdiction to make an award of attorneys fees.
The trial court's assumption that Appellants were either not parties to the Second
District Court action (and thus not entitled to fees under governing law), or were parties to
that action and therefore barred by res judicata, misconstrues both the enabling statute and
the doctrine of claim preclusion. Appellants are not, and cannot be, bound by the Second
District Court ruling denying their application for attorneys fees, as that ruling was based on
the proposition that they were non-parties, and therefore beyond the court's personal
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jurisdiction. To suggest that such exclusion likewise precludes Appellants from seeking
recovery of attorneys fees expended incident to the overall "condemnation proceeding" (as
defined under federal regulatory law), however, would create a meaningless distinction
between the four parties selected as nominal plaintiffs in the Second District Court action,
and the remaining parties positioned in exactly the same way, who had sought joinder in the
Second District Court action prior to its settlement.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
APPELLANTS HEREIN STATED A VALID CLAIM OF
ENTITLEMENT OF RECOVERY OF ATTORNEYS FEES
INCIDENT TO UDOT'S TAKING OF THEIR
PROPERTY, PURSUANT TO 49 C.F.R. PART 24.107,
AND UTAH ADMIN. CODE R933-1.
UDOT' s first argument before the trial court was that, due to its procedural structuring
of the settlement entered in the Davis County action, it has managed to strip the named
Appellants in this action of their right to recover any attorneys fees, in that they were not
properly parties to the Davis County action, and therefore not part of the "settlement" entered
in that "proceeding." UDOT prevailed upon the trial court to read the applicable rule so
narrowly that only the named parties litigant in the Davis County action have any right to
attorneys fees, regardless of how many landowners were required to retain legal counsel to
battle UDOT's taking of their property, prior to effectuation of the global settlement of which
the Davis County action was only a small part:
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Relief can only be granted in this action if the plaintiffs were part of an inverse
condemnation proceeding and effected a settlement of such proceeding.
(UDOT's Memorandum, R. 45-74, at p. 5.) Such a hyper-technical reading of the regulation
in question disregards not only its underlying policy, but its express language, in the interest
of avoiding a clear obligation to pay attorneys fees incurred in resisting an uncompensated
taking of nearly 300 privately-owned properties along the Highway 89 corridor.
49 C.F.R. § 24.107, adopted wholesale by UDOT as a governing state takings
regulation, forms part of a regulatory scheme adopted by the office of the Secretary of
Transportation governing real property acquisition for federal and federally-financed road
projects.4 It reads in its entirety as follows:
The owner of the real property shall be reimbursed for any reasonable
expenses, including reasonable attorney, appraisal, and engineering fees,
which the owner actually incurred because of a condemnation proceeding, if:
(a) the final judgment of the court is that the agency cannot acquire the real
property by condemnation, or
(b) the condemnation proceeding is abandoned by the agency other than under
an agreed-upon settlement; or
(c) the court having jurisdiction renders a judgment in favor of the owner in
an inverse condemnation proceeding or the agency effects a settlement of such
proceeding.

4

It is undisputed in this action that the Highway 89 project received federal funds; in
addition, as noted below, 49 C.F.R. § 24.107 has been adopted wholesale as part of
UDOT's state regulatory scheme - see Rule 933-1-1, Utah Admin. Code.
649163vl

15

49 C.F.R. Part 24.107 was promulgated pursuant to the Uniform Relocation Assistance Real
Property Acquisition Procedures Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4601-4655. At 42 U.S.C. § 4621(b),
Congress declared the purpose of the Uniform Act as follows5:
This subchapter establishes a uniform policy for the fair and equitable
treatment of persons displaced as a direct result of programs or proj ects
undertaken by a Federal agency or with Federal financial assistance.
The primary purpose of this subchapter is to ensure that such persons
shall not suffer disproportionate injuries as a result of programs and
projects designed for the benefit of the public as a whole and to
minimize the hardship of displacement on such persons.
UDOT attempted once before to avoid the clear implication of its adoption of 49 C.F.R. Part
24.107, persuading the Second District Court that no attorneys fees were recoverable by the
named plaintiffs therein, or any other landowner along the Highway 89 corridor. The Utah
Supreme Court, however, ruled that fees were properly recoverable - see Robinson, et al v.
Utah Department of Transportation, 2001 UT 21, 20 P. 3d 396 (Utah 2001). UDOT now
argues that only parties named in actual litigation may recover fees incurred through its
conduct, even though non-party landowners are in precisely the same position as were those
nominally included in the Second District case caption. Both a proper construction of 49
C.F.R. Part 24.107 against the backdrop of the above-stated policy, and a literal reading of
its language, compel the conclusion that UDOT's attempt to avoid responsibility to these

5

That wholesale adoption, by one jurisdiction, of legislative language from another
jurisdiction also presumptively adopts statements of underlying legislative purpose and
judicial interpretations of legislative intent, see De Baritault v. Salt Lake City Corp., 913
P. 2d 743 (Utah 1996); State v. Powasnik, 918 P. 2d 146 (Utah App. 1996).
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Appellants through its current attempt at procedural maneuvering is both misplaced and
improper under law.
A.

Appellants' Participation in the Legislative, Administrative and
Judicial Effort Undertaken by Appellants Along the Highway 89
Corridor, Which Resulted in Compelling UDOT to Acquire
Properties Along the Corridor, Makes Them Part of a
"Proceeding" Within the Meaning of 49 C.F.R. Part 24.107.

49 C.F.R. Part 24.107 entitles a landowner to a recovery of reasonable expenses,
including attorneys fees, "which the owner actually incurred because of a condemnation
proceeding . . . " The term "proceeding" has traditionally been given a broad interpretation
in the law. It is a comprehensive term, broader than the term "action." Generally speaking,
it includes any prescribed course of action for enforcing a legal right, of which the actual
prosecution of judicial action is only a part. See Borough ofJamesburg v. Hubbs, 80 A.2d
100, 6 N.J. 578 (N.J. 1951); Wilder v. Colburn, 21 Haw. 701 (Haw. 1913). It has been
expressly held to include the conducting of business before a nonjudicial body - see Ryan
and Vidas v. Modern Electronic Products, Inc., 295 N.W.2d 514 (Minn. 1980).
49 C.F.R. Part 24.107 advisedly uses the term "condemnation proceeding," as opposed
to "condemnation action," in its granting of reasonable attorneys fees to the landowner. It
clearly contemplates efforts beyond the walls of the courthouse, aimed at securing just
compensation to displaced Appellants. The regulation itself, in fact, contemplates prelitigation "proceedings" falling well outside the scope of a filed lawsuit, including prelitigation notice to the affected property owner of a contemplated taking (49 C.F.R. Part
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24.102(b)); a detailed pre-litigation appraisal process which includes input from the
landowner (49 C.F.R. Part 24.102(c)); the issuance of a written purchase offer by the
condemning authority, including a summary statement of interest being acquired and value
being paid therefor (49 C.F.R. Part 24.102(e)); specified pre-litigation negotiation procedures
to be undertaken in attempts to resolve the landowner's claim without the filing of litigation
(49 C.F.R. Part 24.102(f)); the specification of criteria for the appraisal of private property
(49 C.F.R. Part 24.103); an internal process for agency review of appraisals (49 C.F.R. Part
24.104); etc. It stretches logic to the breaking point to assume that, where the landowner
incurs appraisal, engineering and legal expenses in the course of these pre-litigation
procedures mandated by law, yet still ends up having to file an inverse condemnation
proceeding which thereafter is settled by the condemning agency, such expenses are not
nonetheless considered part of the "condemnation proceeding" for purposes of
reimbursement under Section 24.107.
By the same token, Appellants in this action, as all affected property owners along the
affected Highway corridor, were compelled to hire legal counsel to pursue their interests in
the face of UDOT's determination to take their land without the payment of just
compensation. Whether or not the resulting representation was strictly confined to the
prosecution of the inverse condemnation lawsuit before the Second District Court is not the
point. The underlying facts are that (1) the Appellants are owners of real property within the
affected area; (2) they actually incurred legal fees incident to UDOT's attempts to take their
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property without payment of just compensation; (3) the legal representation thus procured
resulted in the filing, and later settlement, of an inverse condemnation action, which
settlement benefitted Appellants. Whether or not these Appellants' names appeared in the
Davis County case caption is irrelevant - they incurred their legal fees as part of a larger
"condemnation proceeding" which resulted in a settlement of their claims (albeit outside of
the Davis County action), and should be entitled to recover their attorneys fees. To impose
any more restrictive reading on Section 24.107 would defeat Congress's statement of
underlying purpose and policy.
B.

Appellants' Participation in the Davis County Condemnation
Action, as Members of the Proposed Class, Entitles Them to the
Recovery of Their Attorneys Fees.

Even if this Court reads the term "proceeding," as used in Section 24.107, as applying
only to the Davis County inverse condemnation action, UDOT's attempt to exclude
Appellants' participation in an attorneys fee award, by arguing that they were not among the
named settling parties involved in final resolution of that action (as interpreted by the Second
District Court) fails on its face. Appellants' involvement in the Davis County action was
more than sufficient to satisfy the requirements of the regulation.
Appellants were members of the petitioning class which initiated the Davis County
proceeding. As set out at paragraph 6 of their Complaint, Appellants participated in the
preparation and filing of the Complaint in the Second District Court action. The Court
should note, in fact, that prior to the settlement reached in the Davis County action, the
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parties plaintiff in that action filed a proposed Amended Complaint which expressly named
the Appellants in this action (R. 65-74). The Second District Court never ruled on the
proposed amendment, however, as UDOT's $10 million global settlement with property
owners (litigant and non-litigant alike) rendered it unnecessary. The fact that Appellants
were ultimately not named separately as parties in the settlement agreement of record in the
Davis County does not deprive them of their status as participants in that action. As noted
above, a "proceeding" includes all phases of the process invoked in the vindication of a legal
right - not strictly nominal participation in the judgment itself.
1.

Appellants' attorneys fees were incurred "because o f the
Second District Court action.

Appellants in this action retained counsel to obtain for them the relief which was
finally afforded as a direct and proximate result of the initiation of the Second District Court
action. But for the initiation of that action, the settlement matrix ultimately offered by
UDOT to all affected property owners - including the Appellants herein - would not have
occurred. Under these circumstances, Appellants' attorneys fees were clearly "incurred
because of a condemnation proceeding."
2.

The Davis County action resulted in "a settlement."

Under Section 24.107, Appellants are entitled to the recovery of costs and fees
incurred because of a condemnation proceeding if "the agency effects a settlement of such
proceeding" (emphasis added). The regulation does not mandate that the stated settlement
be with the specific landowner in order to trigger a right to the recovery of costs and fees.
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UDOT's insistence, in its Memorandum, that because the named Appellants' herein were not
specifically named in the settlement entered in the Davis County action, they are therefore
not entitled to their attorneys fees, ignores the plain language of the regulation itself.
Appellants incurred attorneys fees; they incurred such fees in connection with the Davis
County action; and UDOT, as the condemning agency, effected "a settlement" in that action.
Under even the narrowest reading of the regulation, therefore, Appellants must be held
entitled to the recovery of costs and fees.
UDOT's entire argument, understandably, emphasizes a narrow reading of the
regulation to preclude Appellants' claims by urging a narrow interpretation of the term
"proceeding." In reality, the more appropriate reading and focus should be on the term
"settlement." The clear intent of section 24.107 is to allow a landowner to recover when
a condemning agency "effects a settlement," not to obsess over the nature and status of
the "proceeding" in which the settlement was affected. Appellants herein clearly
effectuated a settlement with UDOT - via legislative action, administrative negotiations,
and judicial action - all of which formed part of the "proceedings" in question.
UDOT has attempted to avoid its obligations for attorneys fees from the outset of
this matter, the language of its own regulation notwithstanding. It first denied liability for
fees altogether; it then managed to squeeze the Appellants named in this action out of
participation in the attorneys fees award before the Davis County Court. It even
approached affected Appellants individually, attempting to persuade them to discharge
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legal counsel before settlement could be effectuated in the hopes of avoiding attorneys
fees. UDOT now claims, in essence, that it has so engineered the resolution of the
Second District Court action that the named Appellants in this action fall through the
procedural cracks; that, because it agreed to a larger settlement with affected Appellants
along the Highway 89 corridor (all of whom had joined for certification as a class in the
Davis County action), while still avoiding certification of the plaintiff class in that action,
it owes attorneys fees only to the named parties therein. UDOT claims that other
landowners - whose costs and attorneys fees are no less a product of UDOT misconduct
than those incurred by the named parties before the Davis County Court - must somehow
(and in direct derogation of the policies underlying both the state and federal regulatory
structure) be deprived of their right to reimbursement for those fees. Neither the intent
underlying the regulatory scheme nor its express language can possibly countenance such
a result.
POINT II
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN APPLYING THE
DOCTRINE OF RES JUDICATA, OR CLAIM
PRECLUSION, TO APPELLANTS'CLAIMS.
Having argued, in one breath, that the named Appellants in this action were so far
removed from the Davis County action that they cannot claim the right of attorneys fees
incurred with respect thereto, UDOT argued, in the next breath, that the named
Appellants herein are so inextricably bound up in the Davis County action that their
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claims herein are barred under the doctrine ofres judicata. The trial court seized upon
this argument, ruling that Appellants herein were bound by res judicata to the extent that
they were before the Second District Court, and beyond the scope of the statute granting
recovery of fees if they were not.
The lower court ruling ignores the clear and unambiguous language of Judge
Dawson's disposition of UDOT's motion in limine in the Second District action, and the
fact that two separate and distinct tests are involved.
A.

Appellants Are Not Bound by Claim Preclusion.

The doctrine of res judicata, and more particularly the application thereof termed
"claim preclusion," provides that parties to a civil action may not re-litigate, in a separate
proceeding, any causes of action which were or could have been resolved by the prior
action. Application of the doctrine was explained by the Utah Supreme Court in the case
of Snyder v. Murray City Corporation, 2003 Utah 13, 471 Utah Adv. Rep. 5, 2003 Utah
Lex. 34 (2003) as follows:
Generally, "claim preclusion bars a party from prosecuting in a
subsequent action a claim that has been fully litigated previously" [citations
omitted]. In order for a claim to be precluded under this doctrine the party
seeking preclusion must establish three elements:
First, both cases must involve the same parties or their privies.
Second, the claim that is alleged to be barred must have been presented in
the first suit or be one that could or should have been raised in the first
action. Third, the first action must have resulted in a final judgment on the
merits.
2003 Utah at p. 16.
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The inapplicability of the claim preclusion doctrine to Appellants' claims in this
action is self-evident under the foregoing standard. By UDOT's own admission, it
petitioned the Second District Court for an order in limine, preventing any introduction of
evidence relating to attorneys fees incurred by any person not a nominal party thereto.
The Davis County Court's March 19, 2002, ruling went well beyond the evidentiary
nature of the motion, however - Judge Dawson expressly concluded as follows:
This court has no jurisdiction in this action over any person except the four
property owners bound by the Stipulation.
(Emphasis added.) Having no jurisdiction over any persons not named in the suit and
stipulation, therefore, the court can hardly have rendered an adjudication on the merits of
any claim asserted by the Appellants to this action. The Second District Court action not
having concluded with an adjudication of Appellants' claims on the merits, claim
preclusion does not apply.
B.

Appellants' Non-party Status Does Not Preclude Their
Participation in a "Proceeding" Under 49 C.F.R. Part 24.107.

The lower court, in essence, held that either Appellants were parties to the Davis
County action, and are therefore barred by claim preclusion from pursuing this claim, or
they were not parties to the Davis County action, and therefore may not take advantage of
the provisions of Section 24.107. The holding in this regard completely disregards the
different scope of the two provisions.
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Claim preclusion is a rigid, literal doctrine intended only to preclude the relitigation of claims by or against parties to a prior proceeding, to the extent that those
claims were (or could have been) adjudicated on their merits in the prior action. 49
C.F.R. Part 24.107, by contrast, affords attorneys fees to any landowner actually incurring
such fees "because of a condemnation proceeding," where the condemning agency
"effects a settlement of such proceeding." UDOT's success in precluding the named
Appellants herein from participating in an attorneys fee award before the Davis County
Court does not force them beyond the ambit of Section 24.107, but is fatal to any
assertion of claim preclusion.
To accept the lower court's "either-or" analysis of Appellants' status before the
Second District uses an artificial distinction to defeat the purposes articulated in 42
U.S.C. § 4621(b). Appellants, no less than the named plaintiffs before the Second
District Court, have been put to the task of hiring and paying counsel in order to obtain a
settlement on their claims of inverse condemnation. They were part of a proposed class
before that court, and even went to the point of petitioning for inclusion as named
plaintiffs therein. Only the timing of the settlement precluded their joinder. To exclude
them from participation in the awarding of costs and fees would be to exalt form over
substance.
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CONCLUSION
No one wishes more than Appellants that they had been permitted to participate in
the Second Judicial District Court's adjudication of attorneys fees, to all affected
landowners in the Highway 89 corridor, as contemplated by their original Complaint. It
was UDOT's success in persuading Judge Dawson that he lacked personal jurisdiction
over any landowner not expressly named as a party to the stipulation entered in the Davis
County action that has necessitated the filing of this case. With or without the Second
District Court's exercise of personal jurisdiction over these Appellants, however, the fact
remains that they are landowners in an area affected by UDOT's proposed acquisition;
that they had to incur attorneys fees, and participate in the prosecution of a purported
class action in Second District Court, in order to compel UDOT to make peace with all
the affected property owners along the corridor; and that - despite the express language of
both state and federal regulations - those attorneys fees have not been reimbursed by
UDOT.
Dated t h i s X f day of June, 2004.
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